If you'd asked me yesterday when my last post here was, there's about a zero percent chance I would have said "well, nearly a year, obviously." It's amazing how little you actually get done when you have a half-dozen or so projects on the go at the same time. I can't promise to be posting regularly here again, but we'll at least have a little series of posts to work with, on the topic of defensive pairings in the 1930s and 1940s.
I've always found it a bit odd what while we keep track of which side wingers play in hockey (though not always quite accurately, just ask Alex Ovechkin), the same is really never done for defencemen. Bobby Hull played left wing, while Pierre Pilote just played defence. Actually, he mostly played right defence, but for some reason we don't seem to care about that. Red Kelly was a left defenceman, and Eddie Shore was a right defenceman. You don't find these details on any website or in any encyclopedia, however, because apparently it's not important enough to note.
But this distinction is, in fact, very important on the ice. Defencemen are not interchangeable. While many blueliners can and do play both the right side and the left, some defencemen are really only good on one side or the other, and this should be recognized. Generally speaking, right-hand-shot (RHS) defencemen have a significant advantage when playing the right side of the ice, due to being able to stop pucks along the boards, and to shoot pucks out of their zone along the boards, on their forehands, and also being able to receive passes from their defence partner on the forehand as well. Left-hand-shot (LHS) blueliners have similar advantages when playing on the left side. However, because most right-handed people shoot left, and the great majority of people are right-handed, there are more LHS defencemen available than RHS, which results in a significant number of LHS playing the right side due to there being an insufficient number of RHS blueliners.
But not every LHS player is adept at playing the right side. Since you will be playing on your backhand when you're on your off-side, generally it's the better stickhandlers and passers that are able to make the switch effectively. So with all this in mind, it's puzzling that we apparently don't pay any attention to who plays what side.
It wasn't always this way. From 1933 to 1943, for example, the voting for post-season NHL All-Star Teams was split up between right defencemen and left defencemen, just as it was (and is) for wings. That ended with the beginning of the "Original Six" era for some reason, and since that time the league has really paid no attention to it, with every blueliner just being listed as "D" since then.
As such it's worth attempting to reconstruct NHL defencemen's positions. And that's what I'm going to do, starting with the period from 1933 to 1943. I'm starting here for the reason noted above; we have voting records based on the left side and right side for the All-Stars, which should help to provide clues about which side a particular defenceman played. We can't just assume they're completely accurate. Even today, when the dissemination of information about hockey players is so much easier than in the 30s, the voters still considered Ovechkin to be both a right wing and a left wing in 2012/13. He used to play left wing, but had shifted to the right that season, and many voters presumably just assumed he was still on the left. And the same sort of thing could have easily happened 80 years ago, so we can't just take the voting results as gospel.
So what other information do we have to inform our analysis? Well, up until the 1950s, newpapers summaries of NHL games listed the full playing rosters of both team, divided into starters at each position and substitutes. Very occasionally, and I mean very occasionally (especially the later we go in time), the defencemen would be listed as right defence and left defence, and in those cases we know what position the starting defencemen were playing, at least.
But even though each starting defenceman's position was rarely listed, we do know who the starters were, and we know whether each was a RHS or LHS. As such, when a RHS is paired with a LHS, we should be able to assume that the RHS played the right side and the LHS played the left side, due to the advantages inherent in playing on your forehand side.
Or can we? Next time we'll look at some analysis to see if this is a reasonable assumption.
Friday 23 October 2015
Friday 7 November 2014
Puckerings archive: Arena Goal Factors (29 Oct 2002)
What follows is a post from my old hockey analysis site
puckerings.com (later hockeythink.com). It is
reproduced here for posterity; bear in mind this writing is over a
decade old and I may not even agree with it myself anymore. This post
was originally published on October 29, 2002.
Arena Goal Factors
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
One possible source of ideas when doing statistical analysis in hockey is analysis done in other sports. Of course, baseball is the most obvious choice, since so much statistical analysis has been done in that field. But one must be careful when importing ideas to consider the differences that exist between the sports involved.
The concept of park run factors is an example. Park runs factors exist in baseball because different parks have different dimensions and conditions, thereby affecting the number of runs scored in each park. Several people have suggested that such an analysis could be done in hockey, but to my knowledge, no one has published any results.
First, we must ask the question: do factors of this kind (let's call them Arena Goal Factors, or AGF) make sense for hockey? I would say yes, there could be enough differences between arenas (in terms of dimensions, ice condition, etc.) to affect goal-scoring levels. I would expect the differences to be less than in baseball, but would not be surprised if they do exist.
For example, let's take a team that scored 120 goals at home and 100 on the road, and allowed 90 goals at home and 100 on the road. In this league, teams score 55% of their goals at home, while allowing 45% of their goals at home. We would therefore expect this team to score 121 goals at home and allow 86 at home, for a total of 207 goals at home. They actually had 210 total goals at home. Their AGF is therefore 210 divided by 207, or 1.014.
But before we can use this figure, we have to adjust for the fact that a team plays only half its games at home, and half on the road (in other arenas with other AGF figures). Since the sum of league AGF is equal to the number of teams, we calculate the Arena Goal Adjustment (AGA) as follows:
AGA = [(TMS-1)x(AGF)+(TMS-AGF)]/[2x(TMS-1)]
Where TMS is the number of teams in the league. I won't bother with the derivation.
So if the team in the above example played in a 25-team league, its AGA would be 1.007, meaning that players on this team would have their scoring totals increased by about 0.7% due to playing in their particular arena.
That's the theory, anyway. But I won't string you along any more. You can calculate AGA's for each NHL team for each season, but they are not the result of the nature of the arenas. They are random chance.
I calculated AGA's for six NHL seasons: 1990/91, 1991/92, 1994/95, 1995/96, 1998/99 and 1999/2000. If AGA were meaningful, there would be a strong relationship between the AGA for a team one year and the AGA for that team the next year. The results of this inter-year correlation is as follows: between 1990/91 and 1991/92, 0.34; between 1994/95 and 1995/96, -0.05; between 1998/99 and 1999/00, -0.37. The average correlation coefficient is -0.03, which suggests the relationship is entirely random.
For further support, I calculated the correlations between goals-for factors and goals-against factors for each team. If the effects were real, then we would expect to see both goals for and goals against affected in the same way. The results of this intra-year correlation are as follows:
The average correlation is 0.16, which is stronger than the inter-year correlation, but still nowhere near as strong as we would need to say there is a relationship there.
In summary, Arena Goal Factors do not exist in hockey. You can calculate them all you like, but overall they are the result of random chance and do not reflect anything meaningful.
Arena Goal Factors
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
One possible source of ideas when doing statistical analysis in hockey is analysis done in other sports. Of course, baseball is the most obvious choice, since so much statistical analysis has been done in that field. But one must be careful when importing ideas to consider the differences that exist between the sports involved.
The concept of park run factors is an example. Park runs factors exist in baseball because different parks have different dimensions and conditions, thereby affecting the number of runs scored in each park. Several people have suggested that such an analysis could be done in hockey, but to my knowledge, no one has published any results.
First, we must ask the question: do factors of this kind (let's call them Arena Goal Factors, or AGF) make sense for hockey? I would say yes, there could be enough differences between arenas (in terms of dimensions, ice condition, etc.) to affect goal-scoring levels. I would expect the differences to be less than in baseball, but would not be surprised if they do exist.
For example, let's take a team that scored 120 goals at home and 100 on the road, and allowed 90 goals at home and 100 on the road. In this league, teams score 55% of their goals at home, while allowing 45% of their goals at home. We would therefore expect this team to score 121 goals at home and allow 86 at home, for a total of 207 goals at home. They actually had 210 total goals at home. Their AGF is therefore 210 divided by 207, or 1.014.
But before we can use this figure, we have to adjust for the fact that a team plays only half its games at home, and half on the road (in other arenas with other AGF figures). Since the sum of league AGF is equal to the number of teams, we calculate the Arena Goal Adjustment (AGA) as follows:
AGA = [(TMS-1)x(AGF)+(TMS-AGF)]/[2x(TMS-1)]
Where TMS is the number of teams in the league. I won't bother with the derivation.
So if the team in the above example played in a 25-team league, its AGA would be 1.007, meaning that players on this team would have their scoring totals increased by about 0.7% due to playing in their particular arena.
That's the theory, anyway. But I won't string you along any more. You can calculate AGA's for each NHL team for each season, but they are not the result of the nature of the arenas. They are random chance.
I calculated AGA's for six NHL seasons: 1990/91, 1991/92, 1994/95, 1995/96, 1998/99 and 1999/2000. If AGA were meaningful, there would be a strong relationship between the AGA for a team one year and the AGA for that team the next year. The results of this inter-year correlation is as follows: between 1990/91 and 1991/92, 0.34; between 1994/95 and 1995/96, -0.05; between 1998/99 and 1999/00, -0.37. The average correlation coefficient is -0.03, which suggests the relationship is entirely random.
For further support, I calculated the correlations between goals-for factors and goals-against factors for each team. If the effects were real, then we would expect to see both goals for and goals against affected in the same way. The results of this intra-year correlation are as follows:
| Year | Correlation |
| 1990/91 | 0.13 |
| 1991/92 | 0.24 |
| 1994/95 | 0.05 |
| 1995/96 | 0.24 |
| 1998/99 | 0.32 |
| 1999/00 | -0.03 |
The average correlation is 0.16, which is stronger than the inter-year correlation, but still nowhere near as strong as we would need to say there is a relationship there.
In summary, Arena Goal Factors do not exist in hockey. You can calculate them all you like, but overall they are the result of random chance and do not reflect anything meaningful.
Friday 31 October 2014
Puckerings archive: Factors Affecting NHL Attendance (29 Oct 2002)
What follows is a post from my old hockey analysis site
puckerings.com (later hockeythink.com). It is
reproduced here for posterity; bear in mind this writing is over a
decade old and I may not even agree with it myself anymore. This post
was originally published on October 29, 2002.
Factors Affecting NHL Attendance
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
This paper builds upon the work of Wiedecke, who examined factors affecting NHL attendance using a multiple linear regression model. A summary of this work follows.
Data from the 1997/98 NHL season were used, giving 26 data observations. The dependent variable used was the percentage of capacity (called "Attendance Capacity"). That is, if a team averaged 15,000 fans in an arena with a capacity of 15,500, the team had an Attendance Capacity of 97% (15,000 divided by 15,500). The independent variables used were standings points, goals scored, and penalty minutes (which are all self-explanatory), and location (explained below).
Location for each team was assigned a value of 1, 2 or 3 based upon the team's geographic location. A value of 1 was assigned to the northernmost teams (Calgary, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver). A value of 2 was assigned to Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Colorado, Detroit, New Jersey, New York Islanders, New York Rangers, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. A value of 3 was assigned to the southernmost teams (Anaheim, Carolina, Dallas, Florida, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Jose, Tampa Bay, and Washington.
(1) by incorporating a larger data set;
(2) by redefining the dependent variable; and
(3) by introducing a new indepdendent variable.
Rather than using only the 1997/98 season, I will use data from 1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/2000, 2000/01 and 2001/02, giving 193 data observations.
I will use average attendance as the dependent variable, rather than percentage of capacity. By using the percentage, a team which fills 14,800 of 15,000 seats (98.7%) is considered superior to a team which fills 19,700 of 20,000 seats (98.5%). This does not reflect reality well, as the second team draws a full 33% more fans.
The independent variable added is Novelty. A value of 5 is assigned to a team in its first year in the league (after either an expansion or franchise relocation), and this is reduced by one for each subsequent year in the league until it reaches 0. The purpose is to determine if new teams get an attendance boost simply by being new, as if often postulated. The four independent variables used by Wiedecke are also used.
Variable Correlations
A variable correlation analysis is performed to examine the data for possible cross-correlation effects. Only one pair of variables, goals and standings points, has a significant correlation (positive 0.64). Therefore if both goals and points are found to be significant, care must be taken in their interpretation due to cross-correlation. Other pairs with less-significant correlations are attendance and points (positive 0.39), attendance and location (negative 0.31), and location and novelty (positive 0.30).
The following table indicates the coefficients of correlation for all variables used: attendance (ATT), points in standings (PTS), goals scored (GF), penalty minutes (PIM), location (LOC) and novelty (NOV).
Results of the Model
The results of the multiple linear regression model are as follows.
Discussion of Results
The t-statistics of GF, PIM and NOV indicate there is little evidence that they affect attendance in any significant way. On the other hand, there is very strong evidence that PTS and LOC significantly affect attendance. These findings agree with Wiedecke.
Overall, the model is not extremely useful; the R-squared figure indicates only 22.3% of the variability in attendance is explained by the model. This may indicate there are other independent variables that should be considered.
The correlation between the two significant independent variables (PTS and LOC) is -0.17, indicating there is no significant cross-correlation effect.
Interpretation
According to the model, having a good team is the most significant factor affecting attendance. Ceteris paribus, each additional standings point increases attendance by 61 fans per game. A 90-point team therefore has a 610-fan advantage in average attendance over an 80-point team.
The location coefficient indicates that the further south a team is, the worse its attendance is. All else being equal, a team in the southern US averages 1,558 fans less per game than a team in Canada. This is significant because the NHL's recent strategy has been to put as many teams in the southern US as possible, either through expansion or franchise relocations (including moving teams from Canada to the southern US). The results of this model suggest that this strategy is seriously flawed. In this case, analysis agrees with common sense: why are markets where there are hockey fans ignored in favour of markets where there are no hockey fans? At least the most recent expansion was more logical, and didn't put any more teams in the Sun Belt.
Reference
Wiedecke, Jennifer. 1999. Factors Affecting Attendance in the National Hockey League: A Multiple Regression Model. Master's thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Factors Affecting NHL Attendance
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
This paper builds upon the work of Wiedecke, who examined factors affecting NHL attendance using a multiple linear regression model. A summary of this work follows.
Data from the 1997/98 NHL season were used, giving 26 data observations. The dependent variable used was the percentage of capacity (called "Attendance Capacity"). That is, if a team averaged 15,000 fans in an arena with a capacity of 15,500, the team had an Attendance Capacity of 97% (15,000 divided by 15,500). The independent variables used were standings points, goals scored, and penalty minutes (which are all self-explanatory), and location (explained below).
Location for each team was assigned a value of 1, 2 or 3 based upon the team's geographic location. A value of 1 was assigned to the northernmost teams (Calgary, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver). A value of 2 was assigned to Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Colorado, Detroit, New Jersey, New York Islanders, New York Rangers, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. A value of 3 was assigned to the southernmost teams (Anaheim, Carolina, Dallas, Florida, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Jose, Tampa Bay, and Washington.
(1) by incorporating a larger data set;
(2) by redefining the dependent variable; and
(3) by introducing a new indepdendent variable.
Rather than using only the 1997/98 season, I will use data from 1995/96, 1996/97, 1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/2000, 2000/01 and 2001/02, giving 193 data observations.
I will use average attendance as the dependent variable, rather than percentage of capacity. By using the percentage, a team which fills 14,800 of 15,000 seats (98.7%) is considered superior to a team which fills 19,700 of 20,000 seats (98.5%). This does not reflect reality well, as the second team draws a full 33% more fans.
The independent variable added is Novelty. A value of 5 is assigned to a team in its first year in the league (after either an expansion or franchise relocation), and this is reduced by one for each subsequent year in the league until it reaches 0. The purpose is to determine if new teams get an attendance boost simply by being new, as if often postulated. The four independent variables used by Wiedecke are also used.
Variable Correlations
A variable correlation analysis is performed to examine the data for possible cross-correlation effects. Only one pair of variables, goals and standings points, has a significant correlation (positive 0.64). Therefore if both goals and points are found to be significant, care must be taken in their interpretation due to cross-correlation. Other pairs with less-significant correlations are attendance and points (positive 0.39), attendance and location (negative 0.31), and location and novelty (positive 0.30).
The following table indicates the coefficients of correlation for all variables used: attendance (ATT), points in standings (PTS), goals scored (GF), penalty minutes (PIM), location (LOC) and novelty (NOV).
| ATT | PTS | GF | PIM | LOC | NOV | |
| ATT | - | .39 | .25 | -.04 | -.31 | -.17 |
| PTS | .39 | - | .64 | -.28 | -.17 | -.19 |
| GF | .25 | .64 | - | .10 | -.22 | -.17 |
| PIM | -.04 | -.28 | .10 | - | .04 | -.01 |
| LOC | -.31 | -.17 | -.22 | .04 | - | .30 |
| NOV | -.17 | -.19 | -.17 | -.01 | .30 | - |
Results of the Model
The results of the multiple linear regression model are as follows.
| Constant (y-intercept) | 13,326 |
| Standard error of estimate | 2,071 |
| R-squared | 0.223 |
| Variable | Coefficient | St. error | t-stat |
| PTS | 61.08 | 13.56 | 4.50 |
| GF | -6.90 | 7.16 | -0.96 |
| PIM | 0.80 | 0.61 | 1.31 |
| LOC | -778.93 | 211.43 | -3.68 |
| NOV | -47.92 | 119.85 | -0.40 |
Discussion of Results
The t-statistics of GF, PIM and NOV indicate there is little evidence that they affect attendance in any significant way. On the other hand, there is very strong evidence that PTS and LOC significantly affect attendance. These findings agree with Wiedecke.
Overall, the model is not extremely useful; the R-squared figure indicates only 22.3% of the variability in attendance is explained by the model. This may indicate there are other independent variables that should be considered.
The correlation between the two significant independent variables (PTS and LOC) is -0.17, indicating there is no significant cross-correlation effect.
Interpretation
According to the model, having a good team is the most significant factor affecting attendance. Ceteris paribus, each additional standings point increases attendance by 61 fans per game. A 90-point team therefore has a 610-fan advantage in average attendance over an 80-point team.
The location coefficient indicates that the further south a team is, the worse its attendance is. All else being equal, a team in the southern US averages 1,558 fans less per game than a team in Canada. This is significant because the NHL's recent strategy has been to put as many teams in the southern US as possible, either through expansion or franchise relocations (including moving teams from Canada to the southern US). The results of this model suggest that this strategy is seriously flawed. In this case, analysis agrees with common sense: why are markets where there are hockey fans ignored in favour of markets where there are no hockey fans? At least the most recent expansion was more logical, and didn't put any more teams in the Sun Belt.
Reference
Wiedecke, Jennifer. 1999. Factors Affecting Attendance in the National Hockey League: A Multiple Regression Model. Master's thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Friday 24 October 2014
Puckerings archive: Win-Things Theory (18 Oct 2002)
What follows is a post from my old hockey analysis site
puckerings.com (later hockeythink.com). It is
reproduced here for posterity; bear in mind this writing is over a
decade old and I may not even agree with it myself anymore. This post
was originally published on October 18, 2002.
Theory: Win-Things
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
The most common perspective put forward on win theory can be summarized as follows:
Before a game begins, each participating team has a 50% chance to win (a .500 expected winning percentage), ceteris paribus. As the game progresses, and as each team does things that affect their chances of winning or chances of losing, the expected winning percentage of each team changes. For instance, if a team scores a goal after 5 minutes of play, their percentage may change to .550, and the opponent's would therefore be .450, since the percentages necessarily sum to one.
At the crux of this theory lie two ideas: (1) before a game begins, a team's winning percentage is .500, and (2) a team does two types of things that affect its chances of winning: good things (which we'll call "win-things") and bad things (which we'll call "loss-things".)
As a team, you have no significant control over what your opponents do. Therefore, at least from an analytical perspective, you can assume they will do an average number of things to win. At the beginning of a game, you have not yet done anything to win, and have no guarantee that you will do so. Therefore, your expected winning percentage before a game is not .500, but .000.
Teams try to win games, they do not try to lose them. Therefore a loss-thing is merely a failed attempt at a win-thing. Just as darkness is merely the absence of light, loss-things are merely the absence of win-things. Therefore win-things are what matters, and this is why I refer to this theory as Win-Things Theory.
The idea that you cannot control your opponent's actions is carried throughout the thoery. For instance, in the traditional theory, scoring a goal is a very good thing (i.e., it has a high Win-Things value). Under Win-Things Theory, whether or not a shots actually produces a goal is irrelevant to the shooting side. The Win-Things were produced by the shot itself, with a higher-quality shot producing more Win-Things. Conversely, the opponent's Win-Things on the play depend on whether or not the shot is stopped. Stopping the shot produces Win-Things about equal to the Win-Things resulting for the other side by taking the shot. Not stopping the shot produces no Win-Things (it does not produce Loss-Things).
It should be noted that the .000 beginning expected winning percentage applies only to one-team analysis. In two-team analysis, where the actions of both teams are considered, the expected percentage would depend on the Win-Things each team has accumulated. But generally speaking, one-team analysis is more useful in analyzing what contributes to winning, by assuming opponents to be average in all regards.
Traditional theory focusses much attention on expected winning percentage. Win-Things Theory does not. The point is not to get your expected winning percentage up; the point is to accumulate more Win-Things than your opponents. Since you cannot control how many Win-Things your opponents accumulate, the best way to ensure this is to accumulate as many Win-Things as possible.
This theory supports Bill James' Win Shares system for baseball, which I have adapted into the Point Allocation method for hockey. Win Shares has been criticized for not considering "Loss Shares". Using this new theory, Loss Shares are irrelevant, and the criticism is therefore invalid. Opportunity should still be considered, but fortunately in hockey games are timed, while in baseball the opportunities vary greatly from game-to-game, based on a multitude of factors.
Theory: Win-Things
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
The most common perspective put forward on win theory can be summarized as follows:
Before a game begins, each participating team has a 50% chance to win (a .500 expected winning percentage), ceteris paribus. As the game progresses, and as each team does things that affect their chances of winning or chances of losing, the expected winning percentage of each team changes. For instance, if a team scores a goal after 5 minutes of play, their percentage may change to .550, and the opponent's would therefore be .450, since the percentages necessarily sum to one.
At the crux of this theory lie two ideas: (1) before a game begins, a team's winning percentage is .500, and (2) a team does two types of things that affect its chances of winning: good things (which we'll call "win-things") and bad things (which we'll call "loss-things".)
As a team, you have no significant control over what your opponents do. Therefore, at least from an analytical perspective, you can assume they will do an average number of things to win. At the beginning of a game, you have not yet done anything to win, and have no guarantee that you will do so. Therefore, your expected winning percentage before a game is not .500, but .000.
Teams try to win games, they do not try to lose them. Therefore a loss-thing is merely a failed attempt at a win-thing. Just as darkness is merely the absence of light, loss-things are merely the absence of win-things. Therefore win-things are what matters, and this is why I refer to this theory as Win-Things Theory.
The idea that you cannot control your opponent's actions is carried throughout the thoery. For instance, in the traditional theory, scoring a goal is a very good thing (i.e., it has a high Win-Things value). Under Win-Things Theory, whether or not a shots actually produces a goal is irrelevant to the shooting side. The Win-Things were produced by the shot itself, with a higher-quality shot producing more Win-Things. Conversely, the opponent's Win-Things on the play depend on whether or not the shot is stopped. Stopping the shot produces Win-Things about equal to the Win-Things resulting for the other side by taking the shot. Not stopping the shot produces no Win-Things (it does not produce Loss-Things).
It should be noted that the .000 beginning expected winning percentage applies only to one-team analysis. In two-team analysis, where the actions of both teams are considered, the expected percentage would depend on the Win-Things each team has accumulated. But generally speaking, one-team analysis is more useful in analyzing what contributes to winning, by assuming opponents to be average in all regards.
Traditional theory focusses much attention on expected winning percentage. Win-Things Theory does not. The point is not to get your expected winning percentage up; the point is to accumulate more Win-Things than your opponents. Since you cannot control how many Win-Things your opponents accumulate, the best way to ensure this is to accumulate as many Win-Things as possible.
This theory supports Bill James' Win Shares system for baseball, which I have adapted into the Point Allocation method for hockey. Win Shares has been criticized for not considering "Loss Shares". Using this new theory, Loss Shares are irrelevant, and the criticism is therefore invalid. Opportunity should still be considered, but fortunately in hockey games are timed, while in baseball the opportunities vary greatly from game-to-game, based on a multitude of factors.
Friday 17 October 2014
Puckerings archive: Shots and Save Percentage (18 Oct 2002)
What follows is a post from my old hockey analysis site
puckerings.com (later hockeythink.com). It is
reproduced here for posterity; bear in mind this writing is over a
decade old and I may not even agree with it myself anymore. This post
was originally published on October 18, 2002.
Theory: Shots and Save Percentage
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
In my investigation into the validity of Goaltender Perseverence, I looked into the relationship between the number of shots a goaltender faces per game and his save percentage. I found that, as the number of shots per game increases, save percentage does not decrease, on average, as the fundamental assumption of Perseverence argues. In fact, there is some evidence of a positive relationship; that is, as shots increase, save percentage increases.
This evidence was met with an "it doesn't make sense" reaction from those I presented it to. Well, common sense is often dead wrong. To explain this phenomenon, I present the following theory.
For simplicity, I will discuss only two types of shots: easy and tough (referring to the goaltender's perspective). There are in actuality many varying degrees of toughness of shots, but these two will suffice for our purposes.
Easy shots are largely discretionary. They are shots that result from situations where a player could choose to shoot, or choose another play. They are of lower quality than tough shots, because they are usually taken from a greater distance than tough shots, or less favourable circumstances.
Since easy shots are discretionary, there must be a reason that teams do not simply shoot every time, in order to maximize their goals scored. The reason could be twofold: you give up the opportunity to make a pass, which could result in a higher-quality shot, and the shot is more likely to produce a turnover, allowing a possible scoring chance for the opposition. Therefore, it is not always wise to take the shot rather than another play.
Save percentages on tough shots are low, and save percentages on easy shots are high. And since easy shots are primarily responsible for variation in shots faced by a goaltender (since the number of tough shots faced is relatively consistent), save percentage will increase as shots faced increases.
For example, let's say that the average tough shots faced per game is 5, and the save percentage on such shots is .800. This is the same for every goaltender. Any difference in shots faced is due to easy shots, which we'll say have a save percentage of .900.
A goaltender facing 25 shots will therefore face 20 easy shots (25 less 5). Goals against on tough shots is 1.0 (5 less .800 times 5), on easy shots 2.0 (20 less .900 times 20). 3 goals against on 25 shots is an .880 save percentage.
A goaltender facing 35 shots will have the same 1.0 goals against on tough shots, but will have 3.0 on easy shots (30 less .900 times 30). 4 goals against on 35 shots is an .886 save percentage. The goaltender facing more shots on average has a higher save percentage.
That is my theory of how save percentage can increase as shots increase. Unfortunately, this theory cannot be tested using information that is currently available. The NHL does track certain shot data (type, location) for shots that produce a goal, but not for shots that do not produce a goal. If this information were recorded for all shots, it could be used to test this theory.
Theory: Shots and Save Percentage
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
In my investigation into the validity of Goaltender Perseverence, I looked into the relationship between the number of shots a goaltender faces per game and his save percentage. I found that, as the number of shots per game increases, save percentage does not decrease, on average, as the fundamental assumption of Perseverence argues. In fact, there is some evidence of a positive relationship; that is, as shots increase, save percentage increases.
This evidence was met with an "it doesn't make sense" reaction from those I presented it to. Well, common sense is often dead wrong. To explain this phenomenon, I present the following theory.
For simplicity, I will discuss only two types of shots: easy and tough (referring to the goaltender's perspective). There are in actuality many varying degrees of toughness of shots, but these two will suffice for our purposes.
Easy shots are largely discretionary. They are shots that result from situations where a player could choose to shoot, or choose another play. They are of lower quality than tough shots, because they are usually taken from a greater distance than tough shots, or less favourable circumstances.
Since easy shots are discretionary, there must be a reason that teams do not simply shoot every time, in order to maximize their goals scored. The reason could be twofold: you give up the opportunity to make a pass, which could result in a higher-quality shot, and the shot is more likely to produce a turnover, allowing a possible scoring chance for the opposition. Therefore, it is not always wise to take the shot rather than another play.
Save percentages on tough shots are low, and save percentages on easy shots are high. And since easy shots are primarily responsible for variation in shots faced by a goaltender (since the number of tough shots faced is relatively consistent), save percentage will increase as shots faced increases.
For example, let's say that the average tough shots faced per game is 5, and the save percentage on such shots is .800. This is the same for every goaltender. Any difference in shots faced is due to easy shots, which we'll say have a save percentage of .900.
A goaltender facing 25 shots will therefore face 20 easy shots (25 less 5). Goals against on tough shots is 1.0 (5 less .800 times 5), on easy shots 2.0 (20 less .900 times 20). 3 goals against on 25 shots is an .880 save percentage.
A goaltender facing 35 shots will have the same 1.0 goals against on tough shots, but will have 3.0 on easy shots (30 less .900 times 30). 4 goals against on 35 shots is an .886 save percentage. The goaltender facing more shots on average has a higher save percentage.
That is my theory of how save percentage can increase as shots increase. Unfortunately, this theory cannot be tested using information that is currently available. The NHL does track certain shot data (type, location) for shots that produce a goal, but not for shots that do not produce a goal. If this information were recorded for all shots, it could be used to test this theory.
Friday 10 October 2014
Puckerings archive: The Cost of a Penalty (18 Oct 2002)
What follows is a post from my old hockey analysis site
puckerings.com (later hockeythink.com). It is
reproduced here for posterity; bear in mind this writing is over a
decade old and I may not even agree with it myself anymore. This post
was originally published on October 18, 2002.
Theory: the Cost of a Penalty
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
The value of odd-man play is often debated. In the mass media, much ado is made about the power-play (and, to a lesser extent, penalty-killing), calling it a key to success. Others, such as Klein and Reif, downplay its importance, noting that even-strength play is better for predicting success.
This essay takes a conceptual approach to this problem. What, in theory, is the importance of odd-man situations? To examine this question, I will examine a theoretical team, one which is average in all respects.
This team plays in three types of situations: even-strength (ES), power-play (PP) and short-handed (SH). Examining each of these situations reveals the answer we are looking for.
Even-strength: The team is completely average. Therefore, they will score exactly as many ES goals (ESGF) as they allow (ESGA). Thus, their expected net goal differential per minute of ES time (ESMIN) is calculated as follows:
( ESGF - ESGA ) / ESMIN
Which, for reasons discussed above, is zero.
Power-play: On the PP, a team scores about three times as often as at ES, while goals against are cut in half. PP time (PPMIN) produces a net goal differential as follows, using 1998/99 figures:
( PPGF - SHGA ) / PPMIN
= ( 1533 - 220 ) / 16326 ... minutes figure is estimated
= 0.08
Short-handed: Since PP time for one team is SH time for another, SH situations produce the converse of PP, or -0.08 goals per minute.
Taking this all together, as average team will have a winning record if they can obtain more PP opportunities then they give. That's badly phrased, since a team with a winning record cannot be average, but you know what I mean. This is most easily accomplished by taking as few penalties as possible, since you have rather limited control over your opponent's actions.
From this perspective, odd-man situations are extremely important, as they decide games. The team taking fewer non-coincident penalties should win, on average.
If this perspective is valid, then we should be able to predict success based upon PP opportunities for and against. I tested the coefficient of correlation between net PP opportunities and standings points for a selection of recent seasons:
The correlations provide, on average, some support for the theory. They are generally positive, but not that strong (aside from 1998/99, which is very strong). But remember, we are not considering the quality of the teams, unless you consider taking few penalties to be a quality (which you should.) So there is some evidence that this theory is valid.
Theory: the Cost of a Penalty
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
The value of odd-man play is often debated. In the mass media, much ado is made about the power-play (and, to a lesser extent, penalty-killing), calling it a key to success. Others, such as Klein and Reif, downplay its importance, noting that even-strength play is better for predicting success.
This essay takes a conceptual approach to this problem. What, in theory, is the importance of odd-man situations? To examine this question, I will examine a theoretical team, one which is average in all respects.
This team plays in three types of situations: even-strength (ES), power-play (PP) and short-handed (SH). Examining each of these situations reveals the answer we are looking for.
Even-strength: The team is completely average. Therefore, they will score exactly as many ES goals (ESGF) as they allow (ESGA). Thus, their expected net goal differential per minute of ES time (ESMIN) is calculated as follows:
( ESGF - ESGA ) / ESMIN
Which, for reasons discussed above, is zero.
Power-play: On the PP, a team scores about three times as often as at ES, while goals against are cut in half. PP time (PPMIN) produces a net goal differential as follows, using 1998/99 figures:
( PPGF - SHGA ) / PPMIN
= ( 1533 - 220 ) / 16326 ... minutes figure is estimated
= 0.08
Short-handed: Since PP time for one team is SH time for another, SH situations produce the converse of PP, or -0.08 goals per minute.
Taking this all together, as average team will have a winning record if they can obtain more PP opportunities then they give. That's badly phrased, since a team with a winning record cannot be average, but you know what I mean. This is most easily accomplished by taking as few penalties as possible, since you have rather limited control over your opponent's actions.
From this perspective, odd-man situations are extremely important, as they decide games. The team taking fewer non-coincident penalties should win, on average.
If this perspective is valid, then we should be able to predict success based upon PP opportunities for and against. I tested the coefficient of correlation between net PP opportunities and standings points for a selection of recent seasons:
| 1990/91 | 0.11 |
| 1991/92 | 0.26 |
| 1994/95 | 0.02 |
| 1995/96 | -0.02 |
| 1998/99 | 0.63 |
| 1999/00 | 0.23 |
| average | 0.21 |
The correlations provide, on average, some support for the theory. They are generally positive, but not that strong (aside from 1998/99, which is very strong). But remember, we are not considering the quality of the teams, unless you consider taking few penalties to be a quality (which you should.) So there is some evidence that this theory is valid.
Friday 3 October 2014
Puckerings archive: Greatest Teams of All Time (09 Oct 2002)
What follows is a post from my old hockey analysis site
puckerings.com (later hockeythink.com). It is
reproduced here for posterity; bear in mind this writing is over a
decade old and I may not even agree with it myself anymore. This post
was originally published on October 9, 2002.
The Greatest Teams of All Time
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
The most thorough discussion of teams possibly deserving nomination as the greatest of all time is in Klein and Reif's Hockey Compendium. They base their conclusion that the 1929/30 Bruins are the greatest of all time on the team's .875 winning percentage, which is the highest of any team playing the minimum number of games.
There are, of course, two problems with basing the analysis solely on winning percentage. For one, an artificial games limit has to be introduced, to keep those 8-0-0 Montreal Victorias of 1898 and 10-0-0 Montreal Wanderers of 1907 from dominating the list. If we could avoid artificial restrictions like these, we could improve the analysis substantially. As it stands, these teams have no chance of being considered, no matter how great they may have been.
In addition, using winning percentage alone ignores the league context. That is, how good are the other teams in the league? Are there a few weak sisters to beat up on, or is parity the order of the day? Obviously, the greater the parity in the league as a whole, the more difficult it is to run up a high winning percentage. You don't get those cheap points; you have to fight for each win.
Therefore the analysis should be based on the degree by which a team dominates the competition, and the range of quality of said competition. One method to do this is explained below, by way of example.
Let's examine the top two teams by Klein and Reif's analysis. The Boston Bruins of 1929/30 played in a league where the standard deviation of winning percentage was .188, which is fairly high for the era. Boston's winning percentage of .875 is .375 higher than the average (which is .500), or 1.99 standard deviations above the mean (.375 divided by .188). This is called a z-score, and this is what I will base my analysis on. It encompasses both how far above the competition a team was, and how much variation in quality there was between teams. Boston's Winning Percentage Z-Score (WPZS) is therefore 1.99, which is very impressive, but as we'll see, not the best of all time.
The 1943/44 Montreal Canadiens, rated #2 by Klein and Reif, had an .830 winning percentage in a league that a had a standard deviation of winning percentage of .215 (high due to the disparity in talent caused by the war). There was less parity in this league-year than in 1929/30. Montreal's WPZS is 1.53, which while quite high is nowhere near the best of all time.
This means that, relatively speaking, Montreal had a greater benefit of weaker teams to play against than Boston did. By analyzing teams in this way, we consider both the quality of the league and we remove the need for any arbitrary restrictions. Below is the list of the top 48 teams of all time (all those with a WPZS of 1.50 or greater), from among the NHL and its predecessors, as well as the PCHA and WCHL/WHL, and the WHA.
The surprises start at the very top. The greatest team of all time, by this analysis, is the 1995/96 Detroit Red Wings. Their .799 winning percentage had them #7 on Klein and Reif's list. But the standard deviation that year was a mere .116, quite low for the era. Other than Detroit, the best winning percentage was .634. 19 of the 26 teams were between .400 and .600. Parity was the rule, yet Detroit was able to completely dominate the league. Their 2.58 WPZS is far and away the best of all time.
The next two spots come from two teams from the same season. The epic battle between Calgary and Montreal in 1988/89 is revealed to be of truly historic proportions. Other than these two teams, no team had a winning percentage of greater than .575, or less than .381. The parity this year was amazing; the standard deviation was only .100. Calgary's percentage was .731; Montreal's was .719. While both teams miss Klein and Reif's top 20, they're #2 and #3 here. Never has there been two teams which stood futher above the rest of the league.
Spot #4 is the 1976/77 Canadiens. Montreal's 1970's dynasty also makes appearances at #9, #16, #19, and #26. That's a hell of a decade, and it's no surprise that it shows up here.
Two more recent Red Wings sides take the 5 and 7 spots, with the Dallas South Stars outstanding 1998/99 campaign sandwiched in between. The great Bruins of 1929/30, ranked #1 by Klein and Reif, finally appear at #8.
If I were to ask you which Flyers teams was the best in their history, I doubt you would answer "the 1979/80 edition, of course!" But here they are in a tie for 9th with the best the Oilers have to offer, the 1985/86 team. Another 1980's Flyers squad (1984/85) appears at #22, well above the their best of the 1970's (1973/74), which comes in at a tie for #40. 80's Oilers teams also appear at #18, #36, #42, and #45. Not quite the 1970's Canadiens, but not bad.
The highest-ranked team of the pre-NHL era turns out to be the 1912/13 Quebec Bulldogs. In a league where the five other teams had records ranging from 10-10-0 to 7-13-0, Quebec went 16-4-0 to dominate the field.
The Houston Aeros were the WHA's greatest team, no surprise, claiming spots 13, 34, and 38. No other WHA club appears on the list.
Montreal's other great dynasty shows up a few times as well. 1958/59 is #18, 1955/56 is #25, 1957/58 is #28, and 1959/60 is #46. This is probably less impressive than the 1980's Oilers, but more than the Islanders teams which show up at #14, #23, and #42.
The Bruins of the early 70's don't show as well as you might expect, because they played in an expansion era. They appear "only" at #16, #24 and #32. The original Senators also appear thrice, at #25, #34 and #40, the last two from their pre-NHL days.
Finally we have the two perfect clubs mentioned before. Because these teams played in eras notable for their lack of parity, their 1.000 winning percentages are knocked down quite a bit on this list. The 1898 Victorias stand in a tie at #36, while the Wanderers show at #38. These teams (as well as the 1910/11 Senators at #40) were completely blocked out of Klein and Reif's list due to the artificial games restriction. Here, they get a fair shot.
The complete list follows:
For those interested in this sort of thing, here is the distribution of the top 48 seasons of all time: Montreal Canadiens 14; Boston Bruins and Edmonton Oilers, 5; Detroit Red Wings, Houston Aeros, New York Islanders, Ottawa Senators (first edition) and Philadelphia Flyers, 3; Quebec Nordiques/Colorado Avalanche 2; Buffalo Sabres, Calgary Flames, Dallas Stars, Montreal Victorias, Montreal Wanderers, Quebec Bulldogs, St.Louis Blues 1. Notably, half of the Original Six teams (Rangers, Chicago, and Toronto) fail to take a single spot, while the Habs have 29% of the top 48 to themselves.
The Greatest Teams of All Time
Copyright Iain Fyffe, 2002
The most thorough discussion of teams possibly deserving nomination as the greatest of all time is in Klein and Reif's Hockey Compendium. They base their conclusion that the 1929/30 Bruins are the greatest of all time on the team's .875 winning percentage, which is the highest of any team playing the minimum number of games.
There are, of course, two problems with basing the analysis solely on winning percentage. For one, an artificial games limit has to be introduced, to keep those 8-0-0 Montreal Victorias of 1898 and 10-0-0 Montreal Wanderers of 1907 from dominating the list. If we could avoid artificial restrictions like these, we could improve the analysis substantially. As it stands, these teams have no chance of being considered, no matter how great they may have been.
In addition, using winning percentage alone ignores the league context. That is, how good are the other teams in the league? Are there a few weak sisters to beat up on, or is parity the order of the day? Obviously, the greater the parity in the league as a whole, the more difficult it is to run up a high winning percentage. You don't get those cheap points; you have to fight for each win.
Therefore the analysis should be based on the degree by which a team dominates the competition, and the range of quality of said competition. One method to do this is explained below, by way of example.
Let's examine the top two teams by Klein and Reif's analysis. The Boston Bruins of 1929/30 played in a league where the standard deviation of winning percentage was .188, which is fairly high for the era. Boston's winning percentage of .875 is .375 higher than the average (which is .500), or 1.99 standard deviations above the mean (.375 divided by .188). This is called a z-score, and this is what I will base my analysis on. It encompasses both how far above the competition a team was, and how much variation in quality there was between teams. Boston's Winning Percentage Z-Score (WPZS) is therefore 1.99, which is very impressive, but as we'll see, not the best of all time.
The 1943/44 Montreal Canadiens, rated #2 by Klein and Reif, had an .830 winning percentage in a league that a had a standard deviation of winning percentage of .215 (high due to the disparity in talent caused by the war). There was less parity in this league-year than in 1929/30. Montreal's WPZS is 1.53, which while quite high is nowhere near the best of all time.
This means that, relatively speaking, Montreal had a greater benefit of weaker teams to play against than Boston did. By analyzing teams in this way, we consider both the quality of the league and we remove the need for any arbitrary restrictions. Below is the list of the top 48 teams of all time (all those with a WPZS of 1.50 or greater), from among the NHL and its predecessors, as well as the PCHA and WCHL/WHL, and the WHA.
The surprises start at the very top. The greatest team of all time, by this analysis, is the 1995/96 Detroit Red Wings. Their .799 winning percentage had them #7 on Klein and Reif's list. But the standard deviation that year was a mere .116, quite low for the era. Other than Detroit, the best winning percentage was .634. 19 of the 26 teams were between .400 and .600. Parity was the rule, yet Detroit was able to completely dominate the league. Their 2.58 WPZS is far and away the best of all time.
The next two spots come from two teams from the same season. The epic battle between Calgary and Montreal in 1988/89 is revealed to be of truly historic proportions. Other than these two teams, no team had a winning percentage of greater than .575, or less than .381. The parity this year was amazing; the standard deviation was only .100. Calgary's percentage was .731; Montreal's was .719. While both teams miss Klein and Reif's top 20, they're #2 and #3 here. Never has there been two teams which stood futher above the rest of the league.
Spot #4 is the 1976/77 Canadiens. Montreal's 1970's dynasty also makes appearances at #9, #16, #19, and #26. That's a hell of a decade, and it's no surprise that it shows up here.
Two more recent Red Wings sides take the 5 and 7 spots, with the Dallas South Stars outstanding 1998/99 campaign sandwiched in between. The great Bruins of 1929/30, ranked #1 by Klein and Reif, finally appear at #8.
If I were to ask you which Flyers teams was the best in their history, I doubt you would answer "the 1979/80 edition, of course!" But here they are in a tie for 9th with the best the Oilers have to offer, the 1985/86 team. Another 1980's Flyers squad (1984/85) appears at #22, well above the their best of the 1970's (1973/74), which comes in at a tie for #40. 80's Oilers teams also appear at #18, #36, #42, and #45. Not quite the 1970's Canadiens, but not bad.
The highest-ranked team of the pre-NHL era turns out to be the 1912/13 Quebec Bulldogs. In a league where the five other teams had records ranging from 10-10-0 to 7-13-0, Quebec went 16-4-0 to dominate the field.
The Houston Aeros were the WHA's greatest team, no surprise, claiming spots 13, 34, and 38. No other WHA club appears on the list.
Montreal's other great dynasty shows up a few times as well. 1958/59 is #18, 1955/56 is #25, 1957/58 is #28, and 1959/60 is #46. This is probably less impressive than the 1980's Oilers, but more than the Islanders teams which show up at #14, #23, and #42.
The Bruins of the early 70's don't show as well as you might expect, because they played in an expansion era. They appear "only" at #16, #24 and #32. The original Senators also appear thrice, at #25, #34 and #40, the last two from their pre-NHL days.
Finally we have the two perfect clubs mentioned before. Because these teams played in eras notable for their lack of parity, their 1.000 winning percentages are knocked down quite a bit on this list. The 1898 Victorias stand in a tie at #36, while the Wanderers show at #38. These teams (as well as the 1910/11 Senators at #40) were completely blocked out of Klein and Reif's list due to the artificial games restriction. Here, they get a fair shot.
The complete list follows:
| Rank | Team | Year | League | WPct | WPZS |
| 1. | Detroit Red Wings | 1995/96 | NHL | .799 | 2.58 |
| 2. | Calgary Flames | 1988/89 | NHL | .731 | 2.31 |
| 3. | Montreal Canadiens | 1988/89 | NHL | .719 | 2.19 |
| 4. | Montreal Canadiens | 1976/77 | NHL | .825 | 2.18 |
| 5. | Detroit Red Wings | 1994/95 | NHL | .729 | 2.08 |
| 6. | Dallas Stars | 1998/99 | NHL | .695 | 2.05 |
| 7. | Detroit Red Wings | 2001/02 | NHL | .707 | 2.02 |
| 8. | Boston Bruins | 1929/30 | NHL | .875 | 1.99 |
| 9. | Montreal Canadiens | 1977/78 | NHL | .806 | 1.97 |
| 9. | Philadelphia Flyers | 1979/80 | NHL | .725 | 1.97 |
| 9. | Edmonton Oilers | 1985/86 | NHL | .744 | 1.97 |
| 12. | Quebec Bulldogs | 1912/13 | NHA | .800 | 1.94 |
| 13. | Houston Aeros | 1976/77 | WHA | .663 | 1.93 |
| 14. | New York Islanders | 1981/82 | NHL | .738 | 1.92 |
| 15. | Boston Bruins | 1938/39 | NHL | .771 | 1.86 |
| 16. | Boston Bruins | 1970/71 | NHL | .776 | 1.85 |
| 17. | Montreal Canadiens | 1972/73 | NHL | .769 | 1.81 |
| 18. | Montreal Canadiens | 1958/59 | NHL | .650 | 1.79 |
| 18. | Edmonton Oilers | 1983/84 | NHL | .744 | 1.79 |
| 20. | Montreal Canadiens | 1975/76 | NHL | .794 | 1.78 |
| 21. | Colorado Avalanche | 2000/01 | NHL | .720 | 1.77 |
| 22. | Philadelphia Flyers | 1984/85 | NHL | .706 | 1.73 |
| 23. | New York Islanders | 1978/79 | NHL | .725 | 1.72 |
| 24. | Boston Bruins | 1971/72 | NHL | .763 | 1.70 |
| 25. | Ottawa Senators | 1926/27 | NHL | .727 | 1.69 |
| 25. | Montreal Canadiens | 1955/56 | NHL | .714 | 1.69 |
| 27. | Montreal Canadiens | 1978/79 | NHL | .719 | 1.67 |
| 28. | Montreal Canadiens | 1957/58 | NHL | .686 | 1.65 |
| 28. | Buffalo Sabres | 1979/80 | NHL | .688 | 1.65 |
| 30. | St.Louis Blues | 1999/2000 | NHL | .695 | 1.62 |
| 31. | Quebec Nordiques | 1994/95 | NHL | .677 | 1.61 |
| 32. | Montreal Canadiens | 1915/16 | NHA | .688 | 1.58 |
| 32. | Boston Bruins | 1973/74 | NHL | .724 | 1.58 |
| 34. | Ottawa Senators | 1916/17 | NHA | .750 | 1.57 |
| 34. | Houston Aeros | 1974/75 | WHA | .679 | 1.57 |
| 36. | Montreal Victorias | 1897/98 | AHAC | 1.000 | 1.56 |
| 36. | Edmonton Oilers | 1981/82 | NHL | .694 | 1.56 |
| 38. | Montreal Wanderers | 1906/07 | ECAHA | 1.000 | 1.55 |
| 38. | Houston Aeros | 1973/74 | WHA | .647 | 1.55 |
| 40. | Ottawa Senators | 1910/11 | NHA | .812 | 1.54 |
| 40. | Philadelphia Flyers | 1973/74 | NHL | .718 | 1.54 |
| 42. | Montreal Canadiens | 1943/44 | NHL | .830 | 1.53 |
| 42. | Edmonton Oilers | 1984/85 | NHL | .613 | 1.53 |
| 42. | New York Islanders | 1980/81 | NHL | .688 | 1.53 |
| 45. | Edmonton Oilers | 1984/85 | NHL | .681 | 1.52 |
| 46. | Montreal Canadiens | 1944/45 | NHL | .800 | 1.50 |
| 46. | Montreal Canadiens | 1959/60 | NHL | .657 | 1.50 |
| 46. | Montreal Canadiens | 1968/69 | NHL | .678 | 1.50 |
For those interested in this sort of thing, here is the distribution of the top 48 seasons of all time: Montreal Canadiens 14; Boston Bruins and Edmonton Oilers, 5; Detroit Red Wings, Houston Aeros, New York Islanders, Ottawa Senators (first edition) and Philadelphia Flyers, 3; Quebec Nordiques/Colorado Avalanche 2; Buffalo Sabres, Calgary Flames, Dallas Stars, Montreal Victorias, Montreal Wanderers, Quebec Bulldogs, St.Louis Blues 1. Notably, half of the Original Six teams (Rangers, Chicago, and Toronto) fail to take a single spot, while the Habs have 29% of the top 48 to themselves.
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