All-Star Team results from the past provide historians with useful information about how some players were perceived in their own time. Statistical records are of course very informative, but have their limitations. Things like All-Star Team voting records can help shed some light on things that might not be reflected in the stats. They tell us who was seen to be the best at their position at their time, which is particularly useful when it comes to defensive players.
The downside of NHL All-Star Teams is that the league only began these awards in 1931. We know Charlie Gardiner was considered the best netminder in the NHL for the 1930/31 season, but who was seen as the best in 1929/30?
Well, we may not have All-Star voting records from before 1931, but we do at least have the Hart Trophy records, which go back to 1924. (This is all thanks to work done at hfboards.com, see link here.) If we know who the top-rated goaltender in each season from 1924 to 1930 in the Hart voting, maybe we can consider them to be effectively First Team All-Stars. If they had such a vote at the time, we could figure that the goalies seen as the most valuable would also have been seen as the best.
I've certainly seen this sort of argument made, specifically that since Roy Worters received the most Hart Trophy consideration among goaltenders in every season from 1926 to 1929, he should be considered the best goalkeeper of his time. Interpreting this as the equivalent of four consecutive First All-Star Team selections, it's hard to see it otherwise.
As it happens, we do know which goaltender received the most Hart votes each season from 1924 to 1930. In chronological order, they are John Roach, Clint Benedict, Roy Worters, Roy Worters, Roy Worters, Roy Worters and Charlie Gardiner. The fact that Gardiner received the most Hart votes in 1930, and then was the First Team All-Star in 1931, suggests that we may be on to something here.
So maybe Worters was seen as the best goaltender of his time. Considering the competition, his being seen as the best each season is quite something. He was up against a variety of Clint Benedict, Alec Connell, George Hainsworth, Hap Holmes and Hugh Lehman in these seasons, Hall-of-Famers all. Of course, Benedict, Holmes and Lehman were nearing the end of the road at the time, but still, four straight seasons being the best of the best...
But hold on a minute. We also know which goaltenders received the second-most Hart votes in 1924, 1925 and 1926, namely Jake Forbes, Jake Forbes and Doc Stewart. Forbes and Stewart were both good goaltenders, but were not all-time talents by any stretch. And yet, in both 1924 and 1925 Forbes was apparently considered a better netminder than Georges Vezina, and in 1926 Stewart was seen as better tan both Benedict and Connell, if we see Hart votes as the same as All-Star votes. Now, if that is in fact what was going on, we really no longer need to concern ourselves with these voting results, because if that's how the voters saw things, then they shouldn't be taken seriously. Jakes Forbes was not a better goaltender than Georges Vezina.
So there must be something else going on. There is; and next time we'll look at exactly what it is.
Monday, 10 September 2012
Friday, 7 September 2012
Evolution of Hockey Positions
If you're reading this blog, chances are that you know what rovers, points and cover-points are. Or were. They're part of the history of the game; before defencemen we had points and cover-points (or simply covers), the former playing close to the goalkeeper, and the latter being a conduit between the defence and the forwards. The rover was phased out of eastern hockey around 1911/12, while the point/cover positions morphed into side-by-side defenders soon thereafter.
But that's not all there is to the story of positional changes in hockey. If you go far back enough, specifically to 1875 when the first organized, indoor games between two opposing clubs took place in Montreal, there were typically nine men on the ice for either side, rather than the seven we're used to dealing with in early hockey history. They played four forwards as we're used to from the rover era, but had two extra men on defence. Not only that, but the defensive positions were not yet called point and cover, they were back and half-back, a clear indication of the fact that the rules of the game were adapted from football.
I can't be 100% of how the players typically lined up, but I think the following makes sense. The goalkeeper is marked with GK, the backs with B, the half-backs with HB, and the forwards with F.
The first big change in hockey positions came around 1880, when two men were dropped from the standard lineup. I'm not sure of the impetus for this change. The number nine had basically been chosen to fit the practical limits of the Victoria Skating Rink (which bequeathed its 200' by 85' rink size to North American hockey); when played outdoors hockey was played with more men than that. At some point they may have simply decided that 18 men on the ice made it a bit too crowded, and reduced it to 7-on-7.
However, they did not immediately adopt the seven-with-a-rover lineup. They dropped a back and a forward, still playing with two half-backs, thusly:
This standard seems to have lasted about a decade, after which one of the half-backs transmogrified into a fourth forward (the rover), and the other became the cover-point (CP), while the back was now called the point (P). This change from four defenders and three forwards to three defenders and four forwards probably had some effect on goal-scoring, which did uptick at this time, as we'll be looking at in the near future.
This was the standard in eastern hockey for about 20 years, when the decision was made, at least at the game's highest level, to eliminate the rover (as discussed here). That opened the ice up a bit, and brings us close to the setup we're used to today:
It took only another season or so before the point/cover-point setup gave way to the modern lineup, which we still have today...
...which, I think it's safe to say, is not going to change any time soon. It's worked well for almost a century now.
The usual caveats for this sort of general discussion apply, of course. The years mentioned may not be entirely precise, and it's unlikely that every team adopted the same lineup at the same time. Each change would have taken a bit of time to become standard.
But that's not all there is to the story of positional changes in hockey. If you go far back enough, specifically to 1875 when the first organized, indoor games between two opposing clubs took place in Montreal, there were typically nine men on the ice for either side, rather than the seven we're used to dealing with in early hockey history. They played four forwards as we're used to from the rover era, but had two extra men on defence. Not only that, but the defensive positions were not yet called point and cover, they were back and half-back, a clear indication of the fact that the rules of the game were adapted from football.
I can't be 100% of how the players typically lined up, but I think the following makes sense. The goalkeeper is marked with GK, the backs with B, the half-backs with HB, and the forwards with F.
However, they did not immediately adopt the seven-with-a-rover lineup. They dropped a back and a forward, still playing with two half-backs, thusly:
The usual caveats for this sort of general discussion apply, of course. The years mentioned may not be entirely precise, and it's unlikely that every team adopted the same lineup at the same time. Each change would have taken a bit of time to become standard.
Wednesday, 8 August 2012
The Man-Advantage Effect
Normally I like to stick to things that happened in hockey before 1927, but sometimes fascinating things can be found in more recent season, for which of course we tend to have better data than those from long ago.
A recent thread of HFBoards got me looking into the relationship between NHL teams' man-advantage situations and their results in the standings. I wanted to look at each team's net power-plays, which we'll call their net odd-man situations (NOMS) here, and how many points they recorded for the season. As such I computed the coefficients of correlation for each NHL season from 1963/64 to the present, which is all the data that was readily available.
Remember that a positive correlation means that teams with higher point totals for the season also tend to have higher NOMS (ie, receive more man-advantage situations than they give up), while a negative correlation means that teams with higher point totals tend to have lower NOMS. The results are summarized in the table below. A correlation of zero means there is no relationship between a team's place in the standings and its NOMS.
Before the Great Expansion, at least for the seasons I have the data for, a team's NOMS were not strongly predictive of how that team did in the standing. And this held for the first season after expansion as well. But starting in 1968/69, the weaker teams in the NHL had a strong tendency to have a net positive in man-advantage situations. And this is a persistent effect, only getting close to zero for a season or two in the early 1980s, but remaining negative.
This persisted until 1988/89, when the whole thing swung to the positive. Starting in that season, strong teams had a tendency to have a positive NOMS, meaning they received more man-advantage situations than they gave up. Although it has dropped to around zero correlation in five seasons since then, otherwise it's been a positive correlation, and often strongly so.
There are at least two competing effects here, that could explain the relationship between a team's NOMS and its success in the standings.
One is that, obviously, a team with a positive NOMS should be expected, on average, to receive an advantage in net goals (which in turn results in an advantage in wins). Having a man advantage is a large advantage, almost doubling your chance to score a goal in that time and reducing your opponent's chances to almost zero. So based on this, we would expect that a team with a positive NOMS would do relatively well in the standings, which would result in a positive correlation coefficient.
Another factor, however, is score effects. A team with the lead will tend to play defensively. This is why teams with a lead will tend to be out-shot by their opponents. Additionally, I think I'm safe in saying that a team playing defensively will also take more penalties than they draw, since most penalties occur on defence. Since a team that is often in the lead will tend to win more often than one that isn't, that may lead to a good team giving up more man-advantage situations than they receive. This would result in a negative correlation between NOMS and points in the standings.
I suspect, and I haven't done any research to support this, that the first factor would have a stronger effect than the second, since the first involves actually having a higher NOMS while the second involves only the potential for a lower NOMS. That is, the skill/descipline/luck/whatever involved in drawing more penalties than you take is a stronger factor that the score effect. That's just an educated guess, of course.
So from that perspective, the results from 1988/89 to the present make sense. Teams that have a high NOMS should be scoring more goals than their opponents, on average, and therefore the positive correlation makes sense.
But two important questions would then remain: why the negative correlation between 1968/69 and 1987/88, and why the switch from negative to positive in 1988?
One thing that is very different in the NHL from the 1970s to the 1990s is the parity among teams. In the 1970s, the best teams dominated the worst (typically, expansion) teams. Dynasties like the Lafleur Canadiens, Bossy Islanders and Gretzky Oilers do not exist in the NHL today, and haven't for some time. This great disparity in team quality does suggest that, perhaps, the game's officials (knowingly or subconsciously) gave more advantages to the lesser teams in order to give them something of a fighting chance. That's a possibility. And then when relative parity arose, such things were no longer needed and were abandoned, leaving NOMS to grant the advantage that it should, as discussed above.
But there's also the possibility that the players on the better teams, knowing they were so far superior to their opponents, simply took more liberties with opposing players. Perhaps they didn't hesitate to trip the man in the slot, because they knew the resulting power-play would be relatively weak and would likely be killed off. So again, the negative correlation is a result of disparity, but this hypothesis does not require biased officials to function. As such, this is the explanation I currently prefer.
Those are a couple of hypotheses. I welcome yours.
A recent thread of HFBoards got me looking into the relationship between NHL teams' man-advantage situations and their results in the standings. I wanted to look at each team's net power-plays, which we'll call their net odd-man situations (NOMS) here, and how many points they recorded for the season. As such I computed the coefficients of correlation for each NHL season from 1963/64 to the present, which is all the data that was readily available.
Remember that a positive correlation means that teams with higher point totals for the season also tend to have higher NOMS (ie, receive more man-advantage situations than they give up), while a negative correlation means that teams with higher point totals tend to have lower NOMS. The results are summarized in the table below. A correlation of zero means there is no relationship between a team's place in the standings and its NOMS.
Before the Great Expansion, at least for the seasons I have the data for, a team's NOMS were not strongly predictive of how that team did in the standing. And this held for the first season after expansion as well. But starting in 1968/69, the weaker teams in the NHL had a strong tendency to have a net positive in man-advantage situations. And this is a persistent effect, only getting close to zero for a season or two in the early 1980s, but remaining negative.
This persisted until 1988/89, when the whole thing swung to the positive. Starting in that season, strong teams had a tendency to have a positive NOMS, meaning they received more man-advantage situations than they gave up. Although it has dropped to around zero correlation in five seasons since then, otherwise it's been a positive correlation, and often strongly so.
There are at least two competing effects here, that could explain the relationship between a team's NOMS and its success in the standings.
One is that, obviously, a team with a positive NOMS should be expected, on average, to receive an advantage in net goals (which in turn results in an advantage in wins). Having a man advantage is a large advantage, almost doubling your chance to score a goal in that time and reducing your opponent's chances to almost zero. So based on this, we would expect that a team with a positive NOMS would do relatively well in the standings, which would result in a positive correlation coefficient.
Another factor, however, is score effects. A team with the lead will tend to play defensively. This is why teams with a lead will tend to be out-shot by their opponents. Additionally, I think I'm safe in saying that a team playing defensively will also take more penalties than they draw, since most penalties occur on defence. Since a team that is often in the lead will tend to win more often than one that isn't, that may lead to a good team giving up more man-advantage situations than they receive. This would result in a negative correlation between NOMS and points in the standings.
I suspect, and I haven't done any research to support this, that the first factor would have a stronger effect than the second, since the first involves actually having a higher NOMS while the second involves only the potential for a lower NOMS. That is, the skill/descipline/luck/whatever involved in drawing more penalties than you take is a stronger factor that the score effect. That's just an educated guess, of course.
So from that perspective, the results from 1988/89 to the present make sense. Teams that have a high NOMS should be scoring more goals than their opponents, on average, and therefore the positive correlation makes sense.
But two important questions would then remain: why the negative correlation between 1968/69 and 1987/88, and why the switch from negative to positive in 1988?
One thing that is very different in the NHL from the 1970s to the 1990s is the parity among teams. In the 1970s, the best teams dominated the worst (typically, expansion) teams. Dynasties like the Lafleur Canadiens, Bossy Islanders and Gretzky Oilers do not exist in the NHL today, and haven't for some time. This great disparity in team quality does suggest that, perhaps, the game's officials (knowingly or subconsciously) gave more advantages to the lesser teams in order to give them something of a fighting chance. That's a possibility. And then when relative parity arose, such things were no longer needed and were abandoned, leaving NOMS to grant the advantage that it should, as discussed above.
But there's also the possibility that the players on the better teams, knowing they were so far superior to their opponents, simply took more liberties with opposing players. Perhaps they didn't hesitate to trip the man in the slot, because they knew the resulting power-play would be relatively weak and would likely be killed off. So again, the negative correlation is a result of disparity, but this hypothesis does not require biased officials to function. As such, this is the explanation I currently prefer.
Those are a couple of hypotheses. I welcome yours.
Tuesday, 3 July 2012
Who Was the First Thug?
I'm going to talk about fighting again. Those who've been reading my stuff at various places over the years know well my position on fighting in hockey. One particular bramble in my teeth is the claim that fighting has "always been part of the game." This is simply untrue. It's essentially true that violence has nearly always been a part of the game, but fighting certainly has not.
In the early years, the most violent players did not fight; they assaulted, slashed, tripped and bashed, but fighting was rare. Players like Newsy Lalonde, Joe Hall, Alf Smith and Sprague Cleghorn were known to be rash and hostile players to say the least, but since it takes two to fight, such activity was fairly rare. And it was absolutely not the case that they used fighting as a strategic weapon.
That's what critics of fighting really abhor in the modern game. Few people are completely opposed to spur-of-the-moment, spontaneous fights. It's the premeditated, organized thuggery that disgusts most people. And this is a modern phenomenon. Designated goons have not always been part of the game. In fact, they've been around for less than 50 years, when the game has been played in an organized form for over 120.
There were no real thugs in hockey's first decades. By thug, I mean a player whose primary job was to be violent. There have always been players, to be sure, that have made violence a part of their game plan. But until a certain point, there were no players whose designated role was to hit opponents in the face.
In the 1920s, the Montreal Canadiens had a pair of rough defencemen in Bert Corbeau and Billy Coutu. Coutu was something close to a thug at time, but for most of his career he took a regular shift on the blueline with a very good defensive team. These were typical violent players of their day. They were violent, but also useful players, when they could keep themselves out of the penalty box. Jimmy Orlando with the 1940s Red Wings was similar. In four full seasons, he led the NHL in penalty minutes twice and was second once. But for his career, he averaged less than two PIM per game, which is hardly thug territory.
The Rangers' Lou Fontinato (late 50s/early 60s) is another player that seems a bit thuggish. In eight seasons he led the league in PIM three times, and averaged 2.33 PIM per game played. He certainly had a thug's approach to the game, often dropping the gloves, and otherwise trying to punish opposing players with his body. There's a case to be made that Fontinato is hockey's first true thug, though again he might have been too useful on defence to be so called. He played eight seasons on defence, when NHL teams played only four or five blueliners per game. As such the position was too valuable to waste on a thug. Even in today's game, with six defencemen, thug blueliners are rare.
Reggie Fleming (1960s) comes closer to the title of ur-thug. Some years he didn't play much but still too a lot of penalties, and he was certainly considered an intimidator. But still, his penalty totals are a bit low to be a real thug, especially when you consider his often-decent offence as well.
Howie Young might be it. In 1963 he had a truly thuggish season, scoring nine points but recording 273 penalty minutes in 64 games. But that was not typical for Young. He was always fairly high on the PIMs, but never had another thuggy year. His 1963 season could be considered the prototype season for a true thug, but it was not consistently Young's role.
Ultimately, you might be shocked to find that it really started in earnest with the Philadelphia Flyers. The Broad Street Bullies did their best to ruin the game in the 1970s, and it was the 1973 season, when Dave Schultz was inserted into the lineup, that the chaos really began. Along with Bob Kelly and Don Saleski, Schultz (and later others) took violence and intimidation to a whole new level. And it only got worse from there, culminating in Schultz's festering sore of a 1975 season, when he racked up an obscene total of 472 PIM, which beat his own previous record by 35% and which remains 15% more than any other season in NHL history to this day.
The game has only recently begun to recover. Designated thugs are of late becoming less and less common, finally, after decades of players who bring nothing to the rink but fists and fury. No one has broken 400 PIM in a season since 1993, and even 300 PIM has only been recorded three times since the turn of the 21st century. But when it comes to thugs in history, I think it's fair to blame the Flyers. Many other players joined in, but they started it.
In the early years, the most violent players did not fight; they assaulted, slashed, tripped and bashed, but fighting was rare. Players like Newsy Lalonde, Joe Hall, Alf Smith and Sprague Cleghorn were known to be rash and hostile players to say the least, but since it takes two to fight, such activity was fairly rare. And it was absolutely not the case that they used fighting as a strategic weapon.
That's what critics of fighting really abhor in the modern game. Few people are completely opposed to spur-of-the-moment, spontaneous fights. It's the premeditated, organized thuggery that disgusts most people. And this is a modern phenomenon. Designated goons have not always been part of the game. In fact, they've been around for less than 50 years, when the game has been played in an organized form for over 120.
There were no real thugs in hockey's first decades. By thug, I mean a player whose primary job was to be violent. There have always been players, to be sure, that have made violence a part of their game plan. But until a certain point, there were no players whose designated role was to hit opponents in the face.
In the 1920s, the Montreal Canadiens had a pair of rough defencemen in Bert Corbeau and Billy Coutu. Coutu was something close to a thug at time, but for most of his career he took a regular shift on the blueline with a very good defensive team. These were typical violent players of their day. They were violent, but also useful players, when they could keep themselves out of the penalty box. Jimmy Orlando with the 1940s Red Wings was similar. In four full seasons, he led the NHL in penalty minutes twice and was second once. But for his career, he averaged less than two PIM per game, which is hardly thug territory.
The Rangers' Lou Fontinato (late 50s/early 60s) is another player that seems a bit thuggish. In eight seasons he led the league in PIM three times, and averaged 2.33 PIM per game played. He certainly had a thug's approach to the game, often dropping the gloves, and otherwise trying to punish opposing players with his body. There's a case to be made that Fontinato is hockey's first true thug, though again he might have been too useful on defence to be so called. He played eight seasons on defence, when NHL teams played only four or five blueliners per game. As such the position was too valuable to waste on a thug. Even in today's game, with six defencemen, thug blueliners are rare.
Reggie Fleming (1960s) comes closer to the title of ur-thug. Some years he didn't play much but still too a lot of penalties, and he was certainly considered an intimidator. But still, his penalty totals are a bit low to be a real thug, especially when you consider his often-decent offence as well.
Howie Young might be it. In 1963 he had a truly thuggish season, scoring nine points but recording 273 penalty minutes in 64 games. But that was not typical for Young. He was always fairly high on the PIMs, but never had another thuggy year. His 1963 season could be considered the prototype season for a true thug, but it was not consistently Young's role.
Ultimately, you might be shocked to find that it really started in earnest with the Philadelphia Flyers. The Broad Street Bullies did their best to ruin the game in the 1970s, and it was the 1973 season, when Dave Schultz was inserted into the lineup, that the chaos really began. Along with Bob Kelly and Don Saleski, Schultz (and later others) took violence and intimidation to a whole new level. And it only got worse from there, culminating in Schultz's festering sore of a 1975 season, when he racked up an obscene total of 472 PIM, which beat his own previous record by 35% and which remains 15% more than any other season in NHL history to this day.
The game has only recently begun to recover. Designated thugs are of late becoming less and less common, finally, after decades of players who bring nothing to the rink but fists and fury. No one has broken 400 PIM in a season since 1993, and even 300 PIM has only been recorded three times since the turn of the 21st century. But when it comes to thugs in history, I think it's fair to blame the Flyers. Many other players joined in, but they started it.
Friday, 8 June 2012
Minnie McGiffin - Hockey's First Thug
And I don't use the term "thug" in an adulatory manner. Roy "Minnie" McGiffin was not a gentle player by any means, and I shouldn't even describe him that way, since that type of language (so often used even today) glosses over the fact that he was a violent, dangerous player.
To begin with, let's have a look at his career record, using TPAK. We have several missing seasons here. In 1910 he played junior-level hockey in the OHA, at least before he was suspended for unsportsmanlike conduct in February of that year. He was in California during the 1911 hockey season, and spent the 1912 season playing for Cleveland in the USAHA, for which statistics are not currently available. After his playing career ended in 1915, McGiffin served in the US Army Air Service during World War I, and died in an airplane accident in Texas, in 1918.
As you can see, he was a pretty marginal player at the NHA level (and in the amateur game), however a large part of this is due to the penalties he took. He loses 45% of his value as a player on the ice due to the cost to his team of being a man down so very often. For the three seasons McGiffin played in the NHA, from 1913 to 1915, the "top" (actually bottom) three penalty rates (per 60 minutes of ice time) all belong to him:
No one comes close to his level of rule-breaking. McGiffin was at least 46% ahead of the second-ranked player on a per-minute basis every season. He was always in the top two in total penalty minutes (leading in 1914), despite usually being a substitute player. And this isn't an artifact of him being careless, or being prone to being in the wrong place at the wrong time. He was in fact noted as a very violent player in his day:
Like others of his ilk, McGiffin (who was also called "The Hornet") was a dangerous player. He was, of course, liked by his home-team fans, who saw only McGiffin's aggression and willingness to challenge the
opposing players and turned a blind eye to his plain, unvarnished
violence:
To begin with, let's have a look at his career record, using TPAK. We have several missing seasons here. In 1910 he played junior-level hockey in the OHA, at least before he was suspended for unsportsmanlike conduct in February of that year. He was in California during the 1911 hockey season, and spent the 1912 season playing for Cleveland in the USAHA, for which statistics are not currently available. After his playing career ended in 1915, McGiffin served in the US Army Air Service during World War I, and died in an airplane accident in Texas, in 1918.
| Season | Club | League | Pos | Age | GP | MIN | OP | DP | PP | TPA | TPAK |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1909 | Toronto Athletics | OHA | 6 | 17 | 80 | 1600 | 3.5 | -0.3 | -0.7 | 2.5 | 1.56 |
| 1909 | Toronto Athletics | IPAHU | 8 | 17 | 67 | 1340 | -1.7 | -0.8 | -0.6 | -3.1 | -2.31 |
| 1913 | Toronto Blueshirts | NHA | 5 | 21 | 60 | 1200 | 1.8 | 1.1 | -1.0 | 1.9 | 1.58 |
| 1914 | Toronto Blueshirts | NHA | 5 | 22 | 72 | 1440 | 2.2 | 2.1 | -1.3 | 3.0 | 2.08 |
| 1915 | Toronto Blueshirts | NHA | 51 | 23 | 72 | 1620 | 0.2 | 3.8 | -1.8 | 2.2 | 1.36 |
| 351 | 7200 | 6.0 | 5.9 | -5.4 | 6.5 | 0.90 |
As you can see, he was a pretty marginal player at the NHA level (and in the amateur game), however a large part of this is due to the penalties he took. He loses 45% of his value as a player on the ice due to the cost to his team of being a man down so very often. For the three seasons McGiffin played in the NHA, from 1913 to 1915, the "top" (actually bottom) three penalty rates (per 60 minutes of ice time) all belong to him:
| Player | Season | GP | PIM | PIM/60 MIN |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| McGIFFIN, Minnie | 1915 | 18 | 131 | 14.06 |
| McGIFFIN, Minnie | 1914 | 18 | 86 | 10.20 |
| McGIFFIN, Minnie | 1913 | 15 | 83 | 9.73 |
| WILSON, Cully | 1915 | 20 | 138 | 9.63 |
| SKINNER, Alf | 1915 | 16 | 68 | 8.34 |
| BROADBENT, Punch | 1915 | 20 | 115 | 7.80 |
| CARPENTER, Eddie | 1915 | 19 | 63 | 6.28 |
| MUMMERY, Harry | 1913 | 20 | 87 | 5.54 |
| ROBERTS, Gord | 1915 | 19 | 74 | 5.51 |
| PITRE, Didier | 1913 | 17 | 80 | 5.43 |
| BROADBENT, Punch | 1914 | 17 | 61 | 5.37 |
| MUMMERY, Harry | 1915 | 20 | 88 | 5.22 |
| DARRAGH, Jack | 1914 | 20 | 69 | 5.15 |
| RONAN, Skene | 1914 | 19 | 65 | 5.10 |
No one comes close to his level of rule-breaking. McGiffin was at least 46% ahead of the second-ranked player on a per-minute basis every season. He was always in the top two in total penalty minutes (leading in 1914), despite usually being a substitute player. And this isn't an artifact of him being careless, or being prone to being in the wrong place at the wrong time. He was in fact noted as a very violent player in his day:
Minnie McGiffin got into the game every now and again and managed to distinguish himself with the usual line of rough work. In the first period he had only been on a minute or so when he chopped [Hamby] Shore and went off. In the second he started the procession to the penalty bench by crashing into [Art] Ross who at once retaliated...McGiffin then replaced [Jack] Walker and knocked [Jack] Darragh flat with a glaring foul. He was given another major. Later he came back to use the butt end of his stick on [Leth] Graham, knocking the youngster cold. (Montreal Daily Mail, 11 Jan 1915)
According to the official list of penalties Minnie McGiffin is the bad man of pro hockey. However, local fans don't think so. They blame the long list to the officials. A leather-lunged rooter at the Arena Saturday night voiced the feeling of the bleachers when the Torontos made a change in the last period: “Blow your whistle, Umps, Minnie's on the ice. (Toronto World, 1 Feb 1915)
Much like many of today's fans, McGiffin's supporters backed him because he was his own team, while at the same time deriding opposing players for their violent tendencies. But there's a good argument to be made that McGiffin was hockey's first real thug. We'll look at the history of thugs in major hockey next time.
Saturday, 26 May 2012
Old-Tyme Forwards
We've been looking at some terms that can be used to describe historical hockey players in non-anachronistic ways. It's bad enough to describe a modern player as a "power forward", but for Orr's sake just never, ever do it for a player from the 1910s. It doesn't make sense in the context of the player's time. We've looked at goaltenders and defencemen, and we'll finish up today with forwards. In no particular order:
Goal-getting: A goal-getting forward is one that not only scores goals, but actually goes to the net to get his goals. Hence the name. Herb Jordan is an example of a goal-getting forward.
Combination: A combination forward is an expert passer and playmaker. "Combination play" is an old term that was used to describe when players would pass the puck amongst themselves on an offensive push, rather than relying on individual rushes. The great Winnipeg winger (and first known Metis hockeyist) Tony Gingras is a good example of an early hockey forward who assisted his mates rather than scored goals himself.
Stout: A stout forward is one who uses his body to work his way into the offensive zone. If a defender gets in the way, a stout forward is as likely to go through the opponent than around him. He is not necessarily a dirty player, but is a physically punishing one. Bert Russell is a good example of a stout forward.
Backchecking: A backchecking forward is one who takes his defensive responsibility at least as seriously as his offensive duties. "Checking back" is perhaps a surprisingly old term, and forwards were lauded for taking defensive work seriously from the beginning of the organized game. Jack Marks is an example of a backchecking forward.
Skating: A skating forward is a player whose primary game feature is his skating ability. It's not just about speed, of course, but agility as well. While Sinclair 'Speed' Moynes was remarkably fast, his control was terrible and thus probably shouldn't be considered an exceptional skater. Hobey Baker, on the other hand, was known as an outstanding skater, both fast and effective, and is a good example of this type.
Side-shot: A side-shot forward is a gifted scorer, typically a winger, who works from the corners and side of the net. He relies more on his shot to score goals than he does on positioning. Gord Roberts is a good example of a side-shot forward.
Peppery: A peppery forward is an ornery customer, who is generally a physical player, but not clean. He is not afraid to use his fists or his stick when an opponent does something he doesn't like. Peppery is a term often used at the time, and like many terms used today, it's really a euphemism for "rule-breaker" and "dangerous player." Cully Wilson was a good player, but his terrible temper makes him a good example of this type.
Stickhandling: A stickhandling forward is one who controls the game by controlling the puck. It's difficult to remove the disc from his possession. Odie Cleghorn was a noted stickhandler, and used his ability to both score goals and set up his linemates effectively.
Goal-getting: A goal-getting forward is one that not only scores goals, but actually goes to the net to get his goals. Hence the name. Herb Jordan is an example of a goal-getting forward.
Combination: A combination forward is an expert passer and playmaker. "Combination play" is an old term that was used to describe when players would pass the puck amongst themselves on an offensive push, rather than relying on individual rushes. The great Winnipeg winger (and first known Metis hockeyist) Tony Gingras is a good example of an early hockey forward who assisted his mates rather than scored goals himself.
Stout: A stout forward is one who uses his body to work his way into the offensive zone. If a defender gets in the way, a stout forward is as likely to go through the opponent than around him. He is not necessarily a dirty player, but is a physically punishing one. Bert Russell is a good example of a stout forward.
Backchecking: A backchecking forward is one who takes his defensive responsibility at least as seriously as his offensive duties. "Checking back" is perhaps a surprisingly old term, and forwards were lauded for taking defensive work seriously from the beginning of the organized game. Jack Marks is an example of a backchecking forward.
Skating: A skating forward is a player whose primary game feature is his skating ability. It's not just about speed, of course, but agility as well. While Sinclair 'Speed' Moynes was remarkably fast, his control was terrible and thus probably shouldn't be considered an exceptional skater. Hobey Baker, on the other hand, was known as an outstanding skater, both fast and effective, and is a good example of this type.
Side-shot: A side-shot forward is a gifted scorer, typically a winger, who works from the corners and side of the net. He relies more on his shot to score goals than he does on positioning. Gord Roberts is a good example of a side-shot forward.
Peppery: A peppery forward is an ornery customer, who is generally a physical player, but not clean. He is not afraid to use his fists or his stick when an opponent does something he doesn't like. Peppery is a term often used at the time, and like many terms used today, it's really a euphemism for "rule-breaker" and "dangerous player." Cully Wilson was a good player, but his terrible temper makes him a good example of this type.
Stickhandling: A stickhandling forward is one who controls the game by controlling the puck. It's difficult to remove the disc from his possession. Odie Cleghorn was a noted stickhandler, and used his ability to both score goals and set up his linemates effectively.
Tuesday, 22 May 2012
Old-Tyme Defencemen
Last time, which was quite a time ago (thanks, tax season!), I suggested some terms that could be used to describe the style of old-tyme goaltenders, so that we don't have to resort to modern, anachronistic language when discussing them. Now we can have a look at some names for the defenders.
Hardrock: A hardrock defenceman is a physical player, who uses his body to prevent opposing players from approaching the net. He hits them, and if they get up, he hits them again. Fighting has not always been a part of the game, but body-checking has, and these men do it best. Harvey Pulford is an example of a hardrock defenceman.
Lifting: A lifting defenceman is one who excels at clearing the puck out of his end of the rink by lifting it, hurling the puck high into the air so that it cannot be intercepted by the opposition. While common in the early days of the game, this is a tactic not much used today. The Winnipeg Vics' great defensive pair of Rod and Magnus Flett are both noted for their lifting ability.
Rushing: A rushing defencemen is one who relieves the pressure on his side by rushing the puck up the ice himself. He is generally, though not necessarily, a gifted offensive player. He can either carry the puck all the way to the goal, or pass it off to another player for a scoring chance. Mike Grant is a noted example of a rushing defenceman from the game's early days, and there were many others since this style of play attracted so much attention.
Blocking: A blocking defenceman focuses on preventing scoring chances rather than moving the puck up the ice, but unlike the hardrock defenceman he does not rely on physicality to do so. He uses positional play and stick-checking ability to either block the opponent's path to the goal, or to block his shot. James Stewart is a fine example of a blocking defenceman.
Shooting: A shooting defenceman is one who focuses more on the offensive game, but instead of rushing the puck in to the goal, he possesses a deadly shot that can be used from a distance as well as in close. There are many such defenders in the game today, but in hockey's early years such players were fairly rare. Harry Cameron is one example.
I'm always open to suggestions for additional "classes" of player, if you will. Next time: fowards.
Hardrock: A hardrock defenceman is a physical player, who uses his body to prevent opposing players from approaching the net. He hits them, and if they get up, he hits them again. Fighting has not always been a part of the game, but body-checking has, and these men do it best. Harvey Pulford is an example of a hardrock defenceman.
Lifting: A lifting defenceman is one who excels at clearing the puck out of his end of the rink by lifting it, hurling the puck high into the air so that it cannot be intercepted by the opposition. While common in the early days of the game, this is a tactic not much used today. The Winnipeg Vics' great defensive pair of Rod and Magnus Flett are both noted for their lifting ability.
Rushing: A rushing defencemen is one who relieves the pressure on his side by rushing the puck up the ice himself. He is generally, though not necessarily, a gifted offensive player. He can either carry the puck all the way to the goal, or pass it off to another player for a scoring chance. Mike Grant is a noted example of a rushing defenceman from the game's early days, and there were many others since this style of play attracted so much attention.
Blocking: A blocking defenceman focuses on preventing scoring chances rather than moving the puck up the ice, but unlike the hardrock defenceman he does not rely on physicality to do so. He uses positional play and stick-checking ability to either block the opponent's path to the goal, or to block his shot. James Stewart is a fine example of a blocking defenceman.
Shooting: A shooting defenceman is one who focuses more on the offensive game, but instead of rushing the puck in to the goal, he possesses a deadly shot that can be used from a distance as well as in close. There are many such defenders in the game today, but in hockey's early years such players were fairly rare. Harry Cameron is one example.
I'm always open to suggestions for additional "classes" of player, if you will. Next time: fowards.
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